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_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Here we are again.  After our last encounter with the 
periodic review by the Federal Communications Commission 
(the “FCC” or the “Commission”) of its broadcast ownership 
rules and diversity initiatives, the Commission has taken a series 
of actions that, cumulatively, have substantially changed its 
approach to regulation of broadcast media ownership.  First, it 
issued an order that retained almost all of its existing rules in 
their current form, effectively abandoning its long-running 
efforts to change those rules going back to the first round of this 
litigation.  Then it changed course, granting petitions for 
rehearing and repealing or otherwise scaling back most of those 
same rules.  It also created a new “incubator” program designed 
to help new entrants into the broadcast industry.  The 
Commission, in short, has been busy.  Its actions unsurprisingly 
aroused opposition from many of the same groups that have 
battled it over the past fifteen years, and that opposition has 
brought the parties back to us. 
One of these petitioners argues that the FCC did not go 
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far enough, and that the same logic by which it repealed the so-
called “eight voices” test of the local television ownership rule 
(which forbade mergers that would leave fewer than eight 
independently-owned stations in the market) should also have 
led it to abolish the “top-four” restriction in the same rule 
(which forbids mergers among two or more of the four largest 
stations in a market).  We disagree; this was a reasonable 
exercise of the Commission’s policy-making discretion, as we 
held in the first round of this litigation. 
Another group of petitioners argues that the 
Commission’s new incubator program is badly designed, as its 
definition of “comparable markets” for the reward waivers was 
unlawfully adopted and would create perverse incentives.  It 
also argues that the Commission has unreasonably failed to act 
on a proposal to extend the so-called “cable procurement rules,” 
which promote diversity in the cable television industry, to 
broadcast media.  We disagree: the “comparable markets” 
definition for the incubator program was also a reasonable 
exercise of discretion, and the FCC’s failure to act on the 
procurement rules proposal is not unreasonable so far. 
We do, however, agree with the last group of petitioners, 
who argue that the Commission did not adequately consider the 
effect its sweeping rule changes will have on ownership of 
broadcast media by women and racial minorities.  Although it 
did ostensibly comply with our prior requirement to consider 
this issue on remand, its analysis is so insubstantial that we 
cannot say it provides a reliable foundation for the 
Commission’s conclusions.  Accordingly, we vacate and remand 
the bulk of its actions in this area over the last three years.  In 
doing so, we decline to grant the requested extraordinary relief 
of appointing a special master to oversee the FCC’s work on 
remand. 
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I. Background 
To avoid sounding like a broken record, we recount only 
in brief the history of this case up through our most recent 
decision.  The full account of the entire saga can be found in our 
earlier opinions.  See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 
F.3d 372, 382–89 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Prometheus I”); Prometheus 
Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 438–44 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(“Prometheus II”); and Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 824 
F.3d 33, 37–39 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Prometheus III”). 
Under the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 
et seq., Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), the Federal 
Communications Commission has long maintained a collection 
of rules governing ownership of broadcast media.  By 
preventing any one entity from owning more than a certain 
amount of broadcast media, these rules limit consolidation and 
promote a number of interests, commonly stated as 
“competition, diversity, and localism.”  See, e.g., Report and 
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking—2002 Biennial 
Regulatory Review, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620 ¶ 8 (July 2, 2003).  By 
1996, however, there was growing sentiment that these rules 
were overly restrictive, and so Congress passed the 
Telecommunications Act.  Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56 
(1996).  Section 202(h) of that Act requires the Commission to 
review the broadcast ownership rules on a regular basis—
initially biennial, later amended to quadrennial, see Pub. L. No. 
108–199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99–100 (2004)—to “determine 
whether any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as 
the result of competition.”  Telecommunications Act, § 202(h).  
The Commission “shall repeal or modify any regulation it 
determines to be no longer in the public interest.”  Id. 
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Thrice before we have passed on the Commission’s 
performance of its duties under § 202(h), or the lack thereof.  In 
Prometheus I we reviewed the results of the 2002 quadrennial 
review cycle.  Then in Prometheus II we reviewed the results of 
the 2006 review cycle, which included the FCC’s actions on 
remand from Prometheus I, as well as a separate order adopting 
various policies designed to promote broadcast media ownership 
by women and racial minorities. 
After Prometheus II the Commission failed to complete 
its 2010 review cycle prior to the start of the 2014 cycle, and so 
in Prometheus III we reviewed not final agency action pursuant 
to § 202(h) but rather, for the most part, agency inaction.  
Although we found the FCC had unreasonably delayed action on 
the 2010 and 2014 review cycles, we declined to vacate the 
broadcast ownership rules in their entirety, but noted such a 
drastic remedy could become appropriate in the future if the 
Commission continued dragging its feet.  Id., 824 F.3d at 53–54. 
Relatedly, we remanded a newly adopted rule governing the 
treatment of joint sales agreements for purposes of the television 
local ownership rule, reasoning that the FCC could not have a 
valid basis for promulgating such a rule without first having 
determined, as required by § 202(h), that the local ownership 
rule itself should remain in place.  Id. at 58–60. 
We also held that the Commission had unreasonably 
delayed a determination on the definition of “eligible entities.”  
These are given certain preferences under the ownership rules, 
see id. at 41, and the purpose of these preferences was to 
encourage ownership by women and minorities.  The definition, 
however, was drawn from the Small Business Administration’s 
definition of small businesses, and focused solely on a 
company’s revenues.  In Prometheus I we had suggested that, on 
remand, the FCC should consider adopting a different definition 
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based on the criteria for “socially and economically 
disadvantaged businesses” (“SDBs”).  See 373 F.3d at 428 n.70; 
see also 13 C.F.R. § 124.103 (defining socially disadvantaged 
businesses).  The Commission declined to adopt an SDB 
definition, and in Prometheus II we held that the revenue-based 
definition was arbitrary and capricious because there was no 
evidence it would advance the goals of increasing ownership by 
women and minorities.  652 F.3d at 469–71.   
But the Commission had not reached a determination one 
way or the other by Prometheus III.  Instead it had suggested—
in various documents issued after Prometheus II, none of which 
constituted final agency action on the matter—that it would 
reject a SDB definition, or the similar “overcoming 
disadvantage preference” (“ODP”) proposal, because it did not 
believe those rules could survive constitutional scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See 
824 F.3d at 45–48.  It therefore indicated its tentative plan to 
adopt the same definition we held unlawful in Prometheus II, 
even though it still lacked evidence that this would promote 
ownership diversity, because promoting ownership by small 
businesses would be in the public interest regardless.  Id. at 46. 
We held that the Commission “had more than enough 
time to reach a decision on the eligible entity definition.”  Id. at 
48.  This led to a remand and an “order [to] the 
Commission . . . to act promptly to bring the eligible entity 
definition to a close.”  Id. at 50.  It was to “make a final 
determination as to whether to adopt a new definition;” “[i]f it 
need[ed] more data to do so, it must get it.”  Id.  Finally, we 
pointed out that we did “not intend to prejudge the outcome” of 
the FCC’s analysis, and that we would review the merits of its 
eventual decision once that decision had been made through a 
final order.  Id. at 50–51. 
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Three months after we decided Prometheus III, the 
Commission followed through on its promise to take final action 
on the 2010 and 2014 review cycles.  Its Second Report and 
Order, 2014 Quadrennial Regulatory Review, 31 F.C.C.R. 9864 
(2016) (the “2016 Report & Order”), retained all of the major 
broadcast ownership rules—the newspaper/broadcast cross-
ownership rule, the radio/television cross-ownership rule, the 
local radio ownership rule, and the local television ownership 
rule—in their existing forms.  It also adopted, again, a revenue-
based definition for eligible entities.  It concluded that an SDB 
or any related race- or gender-conscious definition could not 
withstand constitutional scrutiny because, even though courts 
might accept viewpoint diversity as a compelling governmental 
interest, the evidence did not show a meaningful connection 
between female or minority ownership and viewpoint diversity.  
Id. ¶ 297.  The Commission also declined to adopt an ODP 
standard, reasoning that it would require individualized 
assessment that is not compatible with the smooth operation of 
the FCC’s rules, and that such an individualized assessment 
could run afoul of First Amendment principles.  Id. ¶ 306.  On a 
related issue, the Commission declined to implement an 
“incubator program,” under which established broadcasters 
would be encouraged to assist new entrants to break into the 
industry, that would have employed an ODP standard.  Finally, 
the Commission reviewed a number of other proposals to 
increase ownership diversity, rejecting most but noting some 
merit in a proposal to extend the cable procurement rules, which 
require cable companies to encourage minority-owned 
businesses to work with them, to broadcast media.  The 
Commission did not adopt this idea, instead calling for further 
comment. 
A number of industry groups filed a petition for 
rehearing, and in November 2017 the Commission granted that 
petition in its Order on Reconsideration and Notice of Proposed 
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Rulemaking, 32 F.C.C.R. 9802 (2017) (the “Reconsideration 
Order”).  This Order made sweeping changes to the ownership 
rules.  It eliminated altogether the newspaper/broadcast and 
television/radio cross-ownership rules.  It modified the local 
television ownership rule, rescinding the so-called “eight 
voices” test but retaining the rule against mergers between two 
of the top four stations in a given market—albeit now subject to 
a discretionary waiver provision.  And it announced the 
Commission’s intention to adopt an incubator program, although 
it left the formal implementation of that program to a subsequent 
order.  In this context, the Reconsideration Order called for 
comment on various aspects of the program, including how to 
define eligibility and how to encourage participation by 
established broadcasters. 
In August 2018 the Commission issued the Report and 
Order—In the Matter of Rules and Policies to Promote New 
Entry and Ownership Diversity in the Broadcasting Services, 33 
F.C.C.R. 7911 (2018) (the “Incubator Order”).  That Order 
established a radio incubator program that would encourage 
established broadcasters to provide “training, financing, and 
access to resources” for new entrants in the market.  Id. ¶ 6.  
Eligibility to receive this assistance was defined using two 
criteria: an incubated entity must (1) qualify as a small business 
under the Small Business Administration’s rules, and (2) qualify 
as a “new entrant,” meaning that it must own no television 
stations and no more than three radio stations.  Id. ¶ 8.  The 
eligibility criteria make no overt reference to race, gender, or 
social disadvantage, but the Commission concluded that using 
the “new entrant” criterion would help boost ownership by 
women and minorities, as a bidding preference for new entrants 
in FCC auctions had that effect.  Id. ¶ 21.   
As an incentive for established broadcasters to participate 
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in the program, the Incubator Order grants the incubating entity 
a reward waiver for the local radio ownership rules.  Among 
other options, the waiver may be used in any market 
“comparable” to the one in which incubation occurs.  Id. ¶ 66–
67.  This means that it must be in the same market tier for 
purposes of the local radio rule, and these tiers are defined by 
the number of stations in a market.  One tier runs from zero to 
14 stations, another from 15 to 29, a third from 30 to 44, and 
finally the highest tier includes all markets with 45 or more 
stations. 
Before us are 10 different petitions for review 
challenging different aspects of the Commission’s actions since 
Prometheus III.  After the 2016 Report & Order issued in 
November of that year, Prometheus Radio Project 
(“Prometheus”) and Media Mobilization Project (“MMP”) filed 
a petition for review in our Court.  About the same time, three 
other petitions for review of the 2016 Report & Order were filed 
in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals: one by The Scranton 
Times, L.P. (“Scranton”); one by Bonneville International 
Corporation (“Bonneville”); and one jointly by the Multicultural 
Media, Telecom and Internet Council, Inc. (“MMTC”) and the 
National Association of Black-Owned Broadcasters 
(“NABOB”).  The cases before the D.C. Circuit were transferred 
here and the four cases consolidated in January 2017; they were 
then held in abeyance while the Commission considered the 
petitions for rehearing. 
After the Reconsideration Order issued in November 
2017, four additional petitions for review were filed: one by 
Prometheus and MMP in our Court as well as three in the D.C. 
Circuit from (1) Independent Television Group (“ITG”), 
(2) MMTC and NABOB, and (3) a coalition of groups including 
Free Press, the Office of Communication, Inc. of the United 
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Church of Christ (“UCC”), the National Association of 
Broadcast Employees and Technicians—Communications 
Workers of America (“NABET-CWA”), and Common Cause.  
Once again the D.C. Circuit transferred the petitions before it to 
our Court, and we consolidated the new wave of cases with the 
existing petitions.   
In February 2018 we stayed all proceedings pending the 
close of notice and comment on the Incubator Order.  Once the 
final Order issued in August 2018, Prometheus and MMP filed a 
petition for review in our Court, and MMTC and NABOB filed 
another in the D.C. Circuit that was transferred here and the 
cases consolidated.   
For purposes of briefing and oral argument, the various 
petitioners divided into three groups.  The first included 
Prometheus, MMP, Free Press, UCC, NABET-CWA, and 
Common Cause, who argue that the Commission has not 
adequately considered how its changes to the broadcast 
ownership rules will affect ownership by women and racial 
minorities.  We refer to this group as “Citizen Petitioners,” 
consistent with our past practice.  See Prometheus III, 824 F.3d 
at 39.  A second group, consisting of MMTC and NABOB, 
argues that the Incubator Order’s definition of “comparable 
markets” is unlawful and that the Commission has unreasonably 
withheld action on a proposal to extend cable procurement rules 
to broadcast media.  To distinguish this group, we refer to its 
members as “Diversity Petitioners.”  Finally, ITG—standing 
alone now as the only “Deregulatory Petitioner”—challenges the 
retention of the “top-four” component of the local television rule 
(which, to repeat, bans mergers between two or more of the four 
largest stations in a given market).   
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The Commission defends its orders in their entirety.  
Additionally, a group of Intervenors—including both Scranton 
and Bonneville as well as many of the Deregulatory Petitioners 
from prior rounds of this litigation—defends the FCC’s actions 
and argues further that Citizen and Diversity Petitioners lack 
standing.   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
We have jurisdiction to hear these petitions for review of 
agency action under 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2342(1).  As noted above and covered in § III.A below, 
Intervenors argue, with the support of the Commission, that 
Citizen and Diversity Petitioners lack standing. 
 Per § 706(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), we can set aside agency action that is arbitrary or 
capricious. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).  “The scope of review under the 
‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”  Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983).  Despite this deference, we require the agency to 
“examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory 
explanation for its action[,] including a rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.”  Id.  (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
When the FCC conducts a Quadrennial Review under 
§ 202(h), that provision also affects our standard of review, as it 
requires that “no matter what the Commission decides to do to 
any particular rule—retain, repeal, or modify (whether to make 
more or less stringent)—it must do so in the public interest and 
support its decision with a reasoned analysis.”  Prometheus I, 
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373 F.3d at 395.  When § 202(h) refers to rules being 
“necessary,” that term means “useful,” “convenient,” or 
“helpful.”  Id. at 394. 
This case also involves challenges to agency inaction.  
Section 706(1) of the APA allows us to “compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”  5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(1).  Under this provision, our “polestar is 
reasonableness.”  Public Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Chao, 
314 F.3d 143, 151 (3d Cir. 2002).  We must “balance the 
importance of the subject matter being regulated with the 
regulating agency’s need to discharge all of its statutory 
responsibilities under a reasonable timetable.”  Oil, Chem. & 
Atomic Workers Union v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 
145 F.3d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1998). 
With this balance in mind, unreasonable delay 
should be measured by the following factors: 
First, the court should ascertain the length of time 
that has elapsed since the agency came under a 
duty to act. Second, the reasonableness of the 
delay should be judged in the context of the 
statute authorizing the agency’s action. Third, the 
court should assess the consequences of the 
agency’s delay. Fourth, [it] should consider any 
plea of administrative error, administrative 
inconvenience, practical difficulty in carrying out 
a legislative mandate, or need to prioritize in the 
face of limited resources. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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III. Analysis 
A. Standing 
As a threshold matter, Intervenors argue that Citizen and 
Diversity Petitioners (called “Regulatory Petitioners” for ease of 
reference in this section) lack standing, and the FCC concurs in 
that argument.  To have standing to sue in federal court under 
Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must have (1) an 
“injury in fact,” meaning “an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized[,] and (b) actual 
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” that is (2) “fairly 
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,” and it must 
(3) be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury 
will be redressed by a favorable decision.”  Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
There are two separate disputes regarding Regulatory 
Petitioners’ standing.  First is a procedural question.  After 
Intervenors raised the issue in their merits brief, Regulatory 
Petitioners submitted declarations to establish standing along 
with their reply briefs.  Intervenors now argue that we should 
not consider those declarations or the facts asserted within them 
because materials to establish standing must be submitted 
instead with Regulatory Petitioners’ opening briefs.  Even 
accepting the declarations, Intervenors still dispute standing.   
We disagree on both counts.  It is well established that 
petitioners challenging agency action may supplement the 
administrative record for the purpose of establishing Article III 
standing, even though judicial review of agency action is usually 
limited to the administrative record.  As the Tenth Circuit 
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observed in US Magnesium, LLC v. EPA, 690 F.3d 1157, 1164 
(10th Cir. 2012), the Article III standing requirements do not 
apply to agency proceedings, and thus there is no reason for the 
facts supporting standing to be a part of the administrative 
record.  It is, moreover, the practice in most of the Circuits that 
have considered the matter to accept these materials at any stage 
of the litigation.  In US Magnesium itself, for example, the 
Tenth Circuit accepted supplemental materials that were 
attached to a petitioner’s reply brief.  Id.  (Its discussion did not 
squarely address the timing issue, only whether a court could 
properly go beyond the administrative record to ascertain 
standing at all.)  The Seventh Circuit has accepted supplemental 
submissions filed after oral argument.  Texas Indep. Producers 
and Royalty Owners Ass’n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 971 (7th Cir. 
2005).  And the Ninth Circuit has expressly held that standing 
need not be established in an opening brief in cases like this.  
Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 117 F.3d 1520, 
1528 (9th Cir. 1997). 
Against this, Intervenors marshal two sources of 
contradictory authority.  First is the Supreme Court’s statement, 
in a footnote in Lujan itself, that “standing is to be determined at 
the commencement of suit.”  504 U.S. at 570 n.5 (emphasis 
added).  This is not on point.  That footnote sought only to rebut 
an argument from Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion that, 
although the agencies whose actions would harm the petitioners 
there were not technically parties to the lawsuit, those agencies 
would not ignore a decision from the Supreme Court 
interpreting the relevant legal provisions, and thus such a 
decision would actually redress the petitioners’ injuries.  The 
majority rejected this argument because it depended entirely on 
the contingent fact that the Supreme Court ended up taking the 
case, which could not have been known at the start of suit.  
Hence “commencement of suit” indicates only that standing 
must exist at the beginning of litigation, not that the materials 
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establishing standing must be submitted at that time.   
The other authorities cited by Intervenors are cases from 
the D.C. Circuit.  See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 
900 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  But that Circuit has a provision of its 
local rules expressly requiring the petitioners in any “cases 
involving direct review . . . of administrative actions” to file 
materials establishing standing along with their opening brief.  
See D.C. Cir. Rule 28(a)(7).  The cases cited by Intervenors all 
simply applied this rule, which does not apply to proceedings in 
our court.  
It appears that this is a question of first impression in our 
Circuit.  To resolve it, we adopt the view held overtly by the 
Ninth Circuit and implicitly by the Tenth and Seventh:  parties 
may submit materials to establish standing at any time in the 
litigation.1  This is especially so here, where the same parties 
have been litigating before us for a decade and a half.  It was not 
unreasonable for Regulatory Petitioners to assume that their 
qualification to continue in the case was readily apparent.  Cf. 
Del. Dep’t. of Nat’l Res. & Envtl. Control v. EPA, 785 F.3d 1, 
8–9 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (permitting petitioners to submit standing 
materials with their reply brief despite the contrary requirement 
of the D.C. Circuit’s local rules when they reasonably believed 
                                              
1 As noted, other courts have gone so far as to accept standing 
materials submitted after oral argument.  See Texas Indep. 
Producers and Royalty Owners Ass’n, 410 F.3d at 971.  This 
could be appropriate where the issue of standing is not raised 
until oral argument.  Although we do not set out a 
comprehensive rule for all cases, in general materials to 
establish standing should be submitted promptly once standing 
is called into question.   
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that standing was self-evident). 
Turning to the substance of standing, Intervenors argue 
that Regulatory Petitioners’ alleged harm is not sufficiently 
imminent to establish standing because any mergers under the 
new rules would require FCC approval and would be subject to 
judicial review; in effect, Regulatory Petitioners have not 
produced evidence that the rule changes will lead to additional 
consolidation.  In addition, Intervenors continue, Regulatory 
Petitioners lack standing because their objections to the rule 
changes pertain to ownership diversity and not to the § 202(h) 
purpose of promoting competition.  We find none of these 
arguments persuasive. 
The first two arguments share a common theme: although 
Regulatory Petitioners will be harmed by consolidation within 
the industry (a fact Intervenors do not appear to contest), it is 
speculative that the new rules will actually lead to consolidation. 
The problem is that encouraging consolidation is a primary 
purpose of the new rules.  This is made clear throughout the 
Reconsideration Order, see, e.g., 32 F.C.C.R. at 9811, 9836.  
The Government cannot adopt a policy expressly designed to 
have a certain effect and then, when the policy is challenged in 
court by those who would be harmed by that effect, respond that 
the policy’s consequences are entirely speculative.  Intervenors 
cite Rainbow/PUSH Coalition v. FCC, 330 F.3d 539, 542–44 
(D.C. Cir. 2003), but that case only held that petitioners there, 
who sought to assert standing simply as audience-members, had 
to demonstrate that a proposed merger would have some specific 
baleful effect(s) on the viewing audience, i.e., some degradation 
of the programming available to that audience.  Here Intervenors 
do not contest that consolidation, if it occurs, will harm the 
Regulatory Petitioners. 
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Nor is it material that any future mergers would require 
FCC approval.  The point is that, under the new rules, it will 
approve mergers that it would have rejected previously, with the 
rule changes in the Reconsideration Order the key factor causing 
those grants of approval.  See Sara Fischer, The local TV 
consolidation race is here, Axios (Aug. 10, 2018), available at 
https://www.axios.com/the-local-tv-consolidation-war-is-here-
7c65f3fb-eaab-43c4-9a00-81303867dbee.html (“Many local 
broadcasters cite one key reason for their consolidation—
[t]he FCC's landmark decision last year to roll back old 
regulations that limited the ability of TV companies to own 
properties in the same market.”).  Intervenors’ citation to 
Clapper v. Amnesty International, USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410–11 
(2013), is not to the contrary.  It involved a “highly attenuated 
chain of possibilities” that, among other things, would make it 
difficult to discern whether the challenged law was even the 
cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.2  The causal 
                                              
2 Clapper involved a challenge to Section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, part of the 
2008 FISA Amendments.  Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 
(2008).  The chain of possibilities the Court identified ran as 
follows: “(1) the Government will decide to target the 
communications of non-U.S. persons with whom they 
communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government will choose to 
invoke its authority under [§ 702] rather than utilizing another 
method of surveillance; (3) the Article III judges who serve on 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court will conclude that 
the Government's proposed surveillance procedures 
satisfy [§ 702]’s many safeguards and are consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment; (4) the Government will succeed in 
intercepting the communications of respondents’ contacts; and 
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chain here is anything but attenuated. 
Intervenors’ third argument fails for multiple reasons.  
First, they identify incorrectly the goals of § 202(h) as limited to 
promoting competition.  Instead, as its text makes plain, review 
under that provision is intended to determine whether each of 
the ownership rules serves the public interest, broadly 
conceived, in light of ongoing competitive developments within 
the industry.  See Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 390–95.   
In addition, there is no requirement that the harm alleged 
be closely tied to a challenger’s legal argument in order to have 
Article III standing.  Intervenors invoke a second 
Rainbow/PUSH Coalition v. FCC case, 396 F.3d 1235, 1242–43 
(D.C. Cir. 2005), there involving an objection to renewal of a 
radio station’s license because it had allegedly engaged in 
employment discrimination.  Audience members, the D.C. 
Circuit held, lacked standing to object because the alleged 
violative conduct at issue had not harmed them at all.  This does 
not support the notion that a party may lack standing, even 
though it will suffer a concrete and particularized injury, simply 
because it is the wrong “kind” of injury.  That argument sounds 
not in the requirements of Article III but of “prudential 
standing,” a now-discredited doctrine under which courts would 
decline to hear cases within their jurisdiction if the plaintiffs’ 
complaint did not fall within the “zone of interests” protected by 
the law they invoked.  In Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), the Supreme Court held 
that this should be understood solely as a matter of statutory 
construction, i.e., of determining whether a given statutory cause 
of action extended to a particular plaintiff.  Intervenors do not 
                                                                                                     
(5) respondents will be parties to the particular communications 
that the Government intercepts.” 
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argue, and could not seriously contend, that Regulatory 
Petitioners do not qualify as “aggrieved parties” for purposes of 
the APA’s general cause of action.  See 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
We emerge from the bramble to hold that Regulatory 
Petitioners have standing.  Thus we proceed to the merits issues 
before us. 
B. Retention of the Top-Four Rule 
Deregulatory Petitioner ITG argues that the FCC’s 
decision to retain its “top-four” local television rule, prohibiting 
the merger of any two of the top four stations in a given market, 
while rescinding the “eight voices” rule, was arbitrary and 
capricious.  This is an issue we dealt with before, in Prometheus 
I, when we upheld the top-four restriction against deregulatory 
challenges.  We noted that “we must uphold an agency’s line-
drawing decision when it is supported by the evidence in the 
record.”  Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 417 (citing Sinclair 
Broadcast Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 162 (D.C. Cir. 
2002); AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 220 F.3d 607, 627 (D.C. Cir. 
2000)).  And the Commission had ample record evidence 
supporting its decision to draw the line at four: it saw a 
“cushion” of audience share between the fourth- and fifth-
ranked stations, reflecting that the top four would be the 
affiliates of the four major national networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, 
and Fox); the same cushion was apparent in national viewership 
figures for the networks themselves; mergers between the third- 
and fourth-largest stations in each of the ten largest markets 
would produce a new largest station; and mergers among top-
four stations would generally increase the statistical 
consolidation of the local market by a substantial amount.  Id. at 
418. 
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Now ITG argues that the FCC “failed to recognize that 
the same reasons it found supported repeal of the Eight-Voice 
test also required it to repeal or modify the Top-Four 
Prohibition.”  ITG Br. at 20.  It first takes issue with the notion 
of a ratings “cushion” between the top-four and other stations, in 
part questioning whether the cushion exists and in part asking 
why it should matter.  Id. at 28–29.  It further contests the FCC’s 
reliance on its conclusion, from the 2002 review cycle, that 
mergers among top-four stations would generally result in a new 
largest station, noting that the evidence shows that mergers 
between the third- and fourth-largest stations would not result in 
a new largest entity in roughly half of the markets with at least 
four stations.  Id. at 29–30.  Finally, it argues that the new 
waiver provision cannot excuse that, as it sees things, the rule as 
a whole is not rationally related to the facts.  Id. at 31–32. 
We disagree.  None of ITG’s arguments meaningfully 
distinguish our holding in Prometheus I.  Just as in that case, 
ITG simply takes issue with the way in which the Commission 
chose to draw the lines.  The basic logic of the top-four rule, as 
we recognized in 2004, is that while consolidation may offer 
efficiency gains in general, mergers between the largest stations 
in a market pose a unique threat to competition.  See 
Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 416.  Although there might be other 
more tailored, and more complex, ways to identify those 
problematic mergers, the simplest is to declare, as the 
Commission has done, that mergers between two or more of the 
largest X stations in a market are not permitted.  The choice of 
X must be somewhat arbitrary: each market’s contours will be 
slightly different, and no single bright-line rule can capture all 
this complexity.  But the television industry does generally 
feature a distinct top-four, corresponding to the four major 
national networks, and four is therefore a sensible number to 
pick.  And this is exactly the kind of line-drawing, where any 
line drawn may not be perfect, to which courts are the most 
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deferential.  See id. at 417.  ITG has much to say about 
everything this simple rule misses, but that is beside the point.  
The Commission has the discretion to adopt a blunt instrument 
such as the top-four rule if it chooses.  Indeed we confronted, 
and rejected, this exact argument—that treating all top-four 
stations the same wrongly ignored the variation in market 
structures—in Prometheus I.  Id. at 417–18. 
Nor is it improper that the FCC’s justification for this 
rule is the same as it was in the 2002 review cycle.  
Section 202(h) requires only that the Commission think about 
whether its rules remain necessary every four years.  It does not 
imply that the policy justifications for each regulation have a 
shelf-life of only four years, after which they expire and must be 
replaced.  Nor does § 202(h), or any other authority cited by 
ITG, require that the Commission always base its decisions on 
perfectly up-to-date data.  In any event, ITG itself cites more 
recent data presented to the Commission through the 
administrative process, and this information paints a picture 
materially identical to what the Commission saw in 2002.   
In this context, we reaffirm our conclusion from 
Prometheus I that retention of the top-four rule is amply 
supported by record evidence and thus is not arbitrary or 
capricious.3   
                                              
3 Accordingly, we need not address ITG’s argument that the 
newly added waiver provision, which allows the Commission to 
permit a merger that would otherwise be barred by the top-four 
rule if “the reduction in competition is minimal and is 
outweighed by public interest benefits,” Reconsideration Order 
¶ 82, cannot save an otherwise irrational rule. 
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C. “Comparable Markets” Definition  
Diversity Petitioners challenge the Incubator Order’s 
definition of comparable markets for radio stations, arguing that 
it was not properly noticed and in any event was arbitrary and 
capricious.   
Their argument devolves to this.  The basic concept of 
the incubator program uses a waiver of the rules governing local 
radio ownership as a reward to induce participation by 
established broadcasters.  The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(“NPRM”) sought comment on the following questions about 
these reward waivers: “How should the Commission structure 
the waiver program?  For example, should the waiver be limited 
to the market in which the incubating activity is occurring?  
Alternatively, should waiver be permissible in any similarly 
sized market?  How would the Commission determine which 
markets are similar in size?”  Reconsideration Order ¶ 137.  
Diversity Petitioners take this to indicate only that the 
Commission was considering two possibilities: either that the 
waiver could only be used in the same market where the 
incubating activity occurred or that it could be used in other 
markets of similar population.  They contend that “size” in this 
context is most naturally read as referring to population, or some 
other indicator of market size (such as audience or listenership 
numbers), as opposed to the number of radio stations in the 
market.  The two responsive comments on this issue, they 
contend, seem to have reflected this assumption.  See Diversity 
Petitioners’ Br. at 16–17. 
Instead, as noted, the Incubator Order adopted a system 
of reward waivers that can be used in any “comparable” market, 
meaning not a market of similar population but one with a 
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similar number of radio stations.  This proposal was first 
described in detail in the draft of the Incubator Order made 
available before the final order was promulgated.  In response, 
Diversity Petitioners made several ex parte communications 
with the Commission expressing their concern over this 
definition of “comparable” markets.  Id. at 21–22.  Their letters 
expressed concern that the proposed rule would allow a 
broadcaster to incubate in a small rural market and then use its 
reward waiver in a much larger market, such as New York City, 
thus getting an outsized return for its investment.  Thus 
Diversity Petitioners suggested that the rule should disallow 
using a waiver in another top-tier “comparable” market that is 
not within five spots of the incubating market in the Nielsen 
population-based rankings, but the Commission declined to 
adopt this proposal.  See Incubator Order ¶ 68.   
Diversity Petitioners argue that this was not adequate 
notice.  We have addressed similar claims in both Prometheus I, 
373 F.3d at 411–412, and Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 449–50.  
Essentially, “the adequacy of the notice must be tested by 
determining whether it would fairly apprise interested persons of 
the ‘subjects and issues’ before the agency.”  Prometheus I, 373 
F.3d at 411 (quoting Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.3d 
284, 293 (3d Cir. 1977)).  The strongest fact supporting 
Diversity Petitioners’ claim is the swift response by  
commenters expressing surprise once the eventual definition of 
comparable markets was made public.  Courts will consider the 
behavior of commenters in assessing whether notice was 
adequate.  See, e.g., Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 315 F.3d 369, 376 
(D.C. Cir. 2003).   
 But parsing the language of the Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking itself suffices to show that it did provide 
adequate notice.  Specifically, after asking whether the waiver 
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should be applicable in any similarly sized market, the NPRM 
asked how the Commission would determine which markets are 
similarly sized.  This strongly suggests that the Commission was 
considering a range of different ways to measure market size, 
and it undercuts Diversity Petitioners’ assertion that the word 
“size” could only be read to mean population.  See Diversity 
Petitioners’ Br. at 16 (“The reference to ‘size’ in the NPRM is 
generally understood in the broadcast industry to mean markets 
that have similar populations.”). 
Turning to the substance of the comparable markets 
definition, Diversity Petitioners assert that the FCC’s definition 
will create a perverse incentive for established broadcasters to 
incubate in markets with low populations but many radio 
stations (using the example of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania) and 
then use their waivers in “comparable” markets with much 
greater populations (e.g., New York City).  The Incubator Order 
responded to this concern by noting that some markets with 
similar populations have vastly different numbers of stations, 
and stated that “[i]n crafting our standard, we focused primarily 
on preventing the potential for ownership consolidation in a 
market with fewer stations and independent owners than the 
market in which the incubation relationship added a new 
entrant.”  Incubator Order ¶ 68.  It expected that incubating 
entities will not necessarily use their waivers only in the largest 
markets, but rather wherever they face ownership restrictions 
under the FCC’s rules.  Id.  And it noted that some incubating 
entities might not have relevant ownership interests in other 
markets of similar population size, such that they would have no 
flexibility under Diversity Petitioners’ proposed rules.  Id. 
Diversity Petitioners posit this as an inadequate response, 
but we disagree.  They are correct that the Commission did not 
rebut the suggestion that waivers might be used in markets with 
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much higher populations than the ones where incubation is 
occurring.  It explained instead why it did not think this prospect 
overly frightening.  Diversity Petitioners suggest that this 
dynamic could reduce the positive influence of the incubator 
program on ownership diversity, as (they claim) smaller markets 
like Wilkes-Barre are less diverse.  This is not supported by the 
record: as Intervenors note, many smaller markets are quite 
racially diverse, see Intervenors’ Br. at 50, and Diversity 
Petitioners’ rejoinder that these markets contain fewer total 
people of color than big cities like New York or Los Angeles, 
Diversity Petitioners’ Reply Br. at 17 n.7, is essentially 
tautological.  And we cannot say that the Commission’s focus 
on the potential anti-competitive effects of the waiver program 
is unreasonable, for the waivers relate specifically to rules 
designed to promote competition.   
We therefore hold that the definition of “comparable 
markets” in the Incubator Order was adequately noticed and is 
not arbitrary and capricious. 
D. Effect of Rule Changes on Ownership Diversity 
Citizen Petitioners argue that the Commission did not 
adequately consider the effect its new rules would have on 
ownership of broadcast media by women and racial minorities.  
We agree.  In Prometheus III we stated that the ongoing attempt 
to bring the 2010 and 2014 review cycles to a close must 
“include a determination about the effect of the rules on 
minority and female ownership.”  824 F.3d at 54 n.13 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Both the 2016 Report & Order and 
the Reconsideration Order ostensibly included such a 
determination, and each concluded that the broadcast ownership 
rules have minimal effect on female and minority ownership.  
 33 
But these conclusions were not adequately supported by the 
record, and thus they were arbitrary and capricious. 
The 2016 Report & Order retained all of the existing 
ownership rules, but it also addressed a proposal to tighten the 
local television and radio ownership rules as a means of 
promoting ownership diversity.  The Commission rejected this 
proposal because it found no evidence that reducing 
consolidation would have that effect based on the following 
evidence.  The National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (“NTIA”) had collected data regarding the 
number of minority-owned stations in the late 1990s. About a 
decade later, the FCC itself began collecting this data through a 
survey using what is called “Form 323.”  See Prometheus III, 
824 F.3d at 44 (discussing the use of Form 323 to gather data 
about minority ownership).  It did so with the express purpose of 
generating better data about ways to increase ownership by 
women and minorities.  Id. 
What the 2016 Report & Order did was to compare the 
NTIA data from the late 1990s, around the time that the local 
ownership rules were first relaxed, with the subsequent Form 
323 data.  It saw the same pattern for television and for radio: an 
initial decrease in minority-owned stations after the rules 
became more flexible to permit more consolidation, followed by 
a long-term increase.  The NTIA showed 312 minority-owned 
radio stations in 1995, just before the local radio rule was 
relaxed, followed by 284 in 1996–97, 305 in 1998, and 426 in 
1999–2000.  Form 323 data, meanwhile, showed 644 such 
stations in 2009, 756 in 2011, and 768 in 2013.  See 2016 Report 
& Order ¶ 126–28.  Turning to television, NTIA data showed 32 
minority-owned stations in 1998—just before the local 
television rule was relaxed—and 23 stations in 1999–2000, 
while Form 323 data showed 60 stations in 2009, 70 in 2011, 
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and 83 in 2013.  Id. ¶ 77.  
Because the trendlines did not show that relaxing these 
rules had played a major role in restricting ownership diversity, 
the Commission thought that reversing the process (that is, 
tightening local radio and television ownership rules) would also 
be unlikely to have a major effect.  Id. ¶ 126.  At the same time 
it did not think that further loosening the rules would be an 
effective means of promoting diversity, as the data did not 
suggest that the increase from the late 1990s through the 2009–
13 period had been caused by the relaxed rules.  See id. ¶ 78, 
128.  The Order stated that the Commission remained “mindful 
of the potential impact of consolidation . . . on ownership 
opportunities for . . . minority- and women-owned businesses, 
and we will continue to consider the implications in the context 
of future quadrennial reviews.”  Id. ¶ 128.  The 2016 Report & 
Order also cited this same data to suggest that its modest 
revisions to the cross-ownership rules would not be likely to 
have a major influence on ownership diversity.  Id. ¶ 196 n.586.  
The Reconsideration Order, by contrast, did make major 
changes to the ownership rules, and it invoked the same 
evidence as the 2016 Report & Order to conclude that this 
would not meaningfully affect ownership diversity.  Thus it 
stated, as to the cross-ownership rules, that “record evidence 
demonstrates that previous relaxations of other ownership rules 
have not resulted in an overall decline in minority and female 
ownership of broadcast stations, and we see no evidence to 
suggest that eliminating the [Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-
Ownership] Rule will produce a different result and precipitate 
such a decline.”  Reconsideration Order, ¶ 46.  As to the local 
television rule, the Order concluded that “the record does not 
support a causal connection between modifications to the Local 
Television Ownership Rule and minority and female ownership 
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levels;” thus the modifications “are not likely to harm minority 
and female ownership.”  Id. ¶ 83.   
Problems abound with the FCC’s analysis.  Most glaring 
is that, although we instructed it to consider the effect of any 
rule changes on female as well as minority ownership, the 
Commission cited no evidence whatsoever regarding gender 
diversity.  It does not contest this.  See Respondent’s Br. at 40 
n.14.  Instead it notes that “no data on female ownership was 
available” and argues that it “reasonably relied on the data that 
was available and was not required to fund new studies.”  Id.  
Elsewhere, however, the Commission purports to have complied 
with our instructions to consider both racial and gender 
diversity, repeatedly framing its conclusion in terms that 
encompass both areas.  See, e.g., id. at 33–36.  The trouble is 
that any ostensible conclusion as to female ownership was not 
based on any record evidence we can discern.  Courts will find 
agency action arbitrary and capricious where the agency 
“entirely fail[s] to consider an important aspect of the problem,” 
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, and that is effectively what 
happened here.  The only “consideration” the FCC gave to the 
question of how its rules would affect female ownership was the 
conclusion there would be no effect.  That was not sufficient, 
and this alone is enough to justify remand. 
Even just focusing on the evidence with regard to 
ownership by racial minorities, however, the FCC’s analysis is 
so insubstantial that it would receive a failing grade in any 
introductory statistics class.  One basic problem is the way the 
Commission treats the NTIA and Form 323 data as comparable, 
even though these two data sets were created using entirely 
different methodologies.  For example, we do not know how 
many minority-owned stations the Form 323 survey would have 
found in 1999, or how many the NTIA’s methods would have 
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found in 2009.  Indeed the NTIA data is known to be 
substantially incomplete, and the large increase in minority-
owned radio stations it showed between 1998 and 1999–2000 is 
thought to have been caused by largely improved methodology 
rather than an actual increase in the number of minority-owned 
stations.  2016 Report & Order ¶ 126.  Attempting to draw a 
trendline between the NTIA data and the Form 323 data is 
plainly an exercise in comparing apples to oranges, and the 
Commission does not seem to have recognized that problem or 
taken any effort to fix it. 
Even if we could treat the use of these two data sets as 
reliable, the FCC’s statistical conclusions are woefully 
simplistic.  They compare only the absolute number of minority-
owned stations at different times, and make no effort to control 
for possible confounding variables.  The simplest of these would 
be the total number of stations in existence.  We do not know, 
for example, whether the percentage of stations that are 
minority-owned went up or down from 1999 to 2009.   
And even if we only look at the total number of minority-
owned stations, the FCC did not actually make any estimate of 
the effect of deregulation in the 1990s.  Instead it noted only 
that, whatever this effect was, deregulation was not enough to 
prevent an overall increase during the following decade.  The 
Commission made no attempt to assess the counterfactual 
scenario: how many minority-owned stations there would have 
been in 2009 had there been no deregulation.   
An analogy helps illustrate this point: if an economy that 
has been growing at an annual 2% rate suffers a serious 
depression in which it shrinks by 10%, and then resumes 
growing at the same 2% rate, a decade later it will likely be 
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bigger than it was on the eve of the depression.  But this does 
not mean that the depression had no effect on the size of the 
economy.  Nothing in the FCC’s analysis rules out, or even 
addresses, the possibility that the 1990s deregulation caused 
such a one-time “depression” of minority ownership even if it 
did not reverse the long-term increase in minority-owned 
stations. 
The Commission does not really contest any of these 
deficiencies in its data or its analysis.  Instead it argues that they 
are irrelevant.  It notes, first of all, that ownership diversity is 
just one of many competing policy goals it must balance when 
adjusting its regulations.  Respondent’s Br. at 32–33.  Thus, the 
Reconsideration Order noted that the Commission should not 
retain a rule that unduly burdened the competitive practices of 
all broadcasters “based on the unsubstantiated hope that these 
restrictions will promote minority and female ownership.”  
Reconsideration Order ¶ 65.  It cites to broad support for 
eliminating the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rules, 
including from minority media owners, as evidence that doing 
so would not have an adverse effect on minority ownership.  
Respondent’s Br. at 34.  And it asserts that, while the data used 
was not perfect, it was the only evidence available as to the 
effects of earlier rounds of deregulation on ownership diversity. 
 Id. at 40.  The Commission solicited evidence on this issue 
during the notice-and-comment period, and it did not receive 
any information of higher quality than the NTIA/Form 323 data. 
Thus it argues it had no affirmative burden to produce additional 
evidence or to fund new studies itself.  Id. at 47 (citing Stilwell 
v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 569 F.3d 514, 519 (D.C. Cir. 
2009)). 
We are not persuaded.  It is true that “[t]he APA imposes 
no general obligation on agencies to produce empirical 
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evidence,” only to “justify its rule with a reasoned explanation.” 
 Stilwell, 569 F.3d at 519.  But in this case the reasoned 
explanation given by the Commission rested on faulty and 
insubstantial data.  In Stilwell the agency had proceeded based 
on its “long experience” supervising the regulated industry and 
had support from the commenters.  Id.  Here, the Commission 
has not relied on its general expertise, and, outside of the 
modifications to the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule, 
it does not rely on support from commenters.  It has not offered 
any theoretical models or analysis of what the likely effect of 
consolidation on ownership diversity would be.  Instead it has 
confined its reasoning to an insubstantial statistical analysis of 
unreliable data—and, again, has not offered even that much as 
to the effect of its rules on female ownership.   
Finally, it is true that promoting ownership diversity is 
but one of the policy goals the FCC must consider.  But this only 
highlights that it is something the Commission must consider.  It 
is, as State Farm says, “an important aspect of the problem.”  
463 U.S. at 43.  The Commission might well be within its rights 
to adopt a new deregulatory framework (even if the rule changes 
would have some adverse effect on ownership diversity) if it 
gave a meaningful evaluation of that effect and then explained 
why it believed the trade-off was justified for other policy 
reasons.  But it has not done so.  Instead it has proceeded on the 
basis that consolidation will not harm ownership diversity.  This 
may be so; perhaps a more sophisticated analysis would 
strengthen, not weaken, the FCC’s position.  But based on the 
evidence and reasoning the Commission has given us, we simply 
cannot say one way or the other.  This violated the 
Commission’s obligations under the APA and our remand 
instructions, and we “may not supply a reasoned basis for the 
agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.”  Id. (citing 
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).   
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Accordingly, we vacate the Reconsideration Order and 
the Incubator Order in their entirety, as well as the “eligible 
entity” definition from the 2016 Report & Order.  On remand 
the Commission must ascertain on record evidence the likely 
effect of any rule changes it proposes and whatever “eligible 
entity” definition it adopts on ownership by women and 
minorities, whether through new empirical research or an in-
depth theoretical analysis.  If it finds that a proposed rule change 
would likely have an adverse effect on ownership diversity but 
nonetheless believes that rule in the public interest all things 
considered, it must say so and explain its reasoning.  If it finds 
that its proposed definition for eligible entities will not 
meaningfully advance ownership diversity, it must explain why 
it could not adopt an alternate definition that would do so.  Once 
again we do not prejudge the outcome of any of this, but the 
Commission must provide a substantial basis and justification 
for its actions whatever it ultimately decides. 
E. Delay in Adopting Procurement Rules 
Finally, Diversity Petitioners argue that the Commission 
has unreasonably delayed action on their proposal to extend the 
cable procurement rules to broadcast media.  These rules require 
cable companies to encourage minority- and female-owned 
businesses to do business with them.  See 47 C.F.R. § 76.75(e).  
A proposal to apply similar rules to broadcast media companies 
was one of the proposals we instructed the Commission to 
consider on remand all the way back in Prometheus I.  See 373 
F.3d at 421 n.59.  In Prometheus III, the same Diversity 
Petitioners argued the FCC had unlawfully refused to address 
these proposals.  We declined to pass on this challenge, noting 
that the Chairman of the FCC had committed to addressing these 
proposals in what eventually became the 2016 Report & Order, 
and thus the challenge was premature.  See 824 F.3d at 50 n.11.  
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At the same time we “note[d] our expectation that the 
Commission will meet its proffered deadline.”  The 2016 Report 
& Order ultimately found that there was “merit in exploring” 
whether to adopt this proposal, and stated that it would “evaluate 
the feasibility” of doing so.  2016 Report & Order ¶ 330.  [J.A. 
at 169]  The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the 2018 cycle 
sought comment on a number of aspects of this proposal, 
including its constitutionality.   See 2018 Quadrennial 
Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast 
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 
202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 84 F.R. 6741, 6752 (Feb. 28, 2019) 
As set out at length in Prometheus III, when reviewing a 
claim of unreasonable agency delay we evaluate four factors: 
first, the length of time since the agency came under a duty to 
act; second, the context of the statute authorizing the agency’s 
action; third, the consequences of the agency’s delay; and, 
finally, any claim of administrative error, inconvenience, or 
practical difficulty carrying out the obligation, especially in light 
of limited resources.  See 824 F.3d at 39–40 (quoting Oil, Chem. 
& Atomic Workers Union, 145 F.3d at 123).   
The Commission argues it has not unreasonably delayed 
action because the record as of the 2016 Report & Order did not 
support adopting the proposal—largely because the commenters 
did not offer any substantial supporting materials for it.  See 
Respondent’s Br. at 89.  We agree.  This is not like the eligible 
entity issue in Prometheus III, where the FCC had failed to act 
for well over a decade.  At most, the agency’s failure to act 
began with the 2016 Report & Order three years ago.  And the 
consequence of the Commission’s failure to act at that time was 
evidently to keep the proposal alive, rather than rejecting it 
outright for lack of support.  Given all of this, not to mention 
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that the NPRM for the 2018 cycle has sought further comment 
on this proposal, we do not at this time find unreasonable delay 
by the Commission.   
That being said, we do anticipate that the Commission 
will take final action on this proposal one way or another when 
it resolves the 2018 review cycle, at which time its decision will 
be subject to judicial review.  If it does not do so, we may reach 
a different conclusion as to the reasonableness of that additional 
delay. 
F. Conclusion 
Citizens and Diversity Petitioners have standing to press 
their claims.  On the merits, we hold that the FCC’s retention of 
the “top-four” prong of its local television ownership rule was 
not arbitrary and capricious.  We also hold that the Incubator 
Order’s definition of “comparable markets” was adequately 
noticed and was not arbitrary and capricious.  And we decline to 
hold that the FCC has unreasonably delayed action on the 
proposal to adopt procurement rules for the broadcasting 
industry.  We do conclude, however, that the Commission has 
not shown yet that it adequately considered the effect its actions 
since Prometheus III will have on diversity in broadcast media 
ownership.  We therefore vacate and remand the 
Reconsideration and Incubator Orders in their entirety, as well 
as the “eligible entity” definition from the 2016 Report & Order. 
  
Citizen Petitioners ask us to appoint a mediator or master 
to “ensure timely compliance” with our decision.  Citizen 
Petitioners’ Br. at 43.  Courts will sometimes appoint a special 
master to oversee compliance with remedial decrees, but these 
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cases typically involve institutions such as prisons where the 
Court could not otherwise easily ascertain whether the defendant 
is complying, and the master’s job is limited only to observing 
and reporting.  See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 
1982), amended in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 
688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).  There is no need for 
such an observational special master here, where the 
Commission’s actions on remand will be published in the 
Federal Register and readily available for subsequent judicial 
review.  Moreover, we would decline in any event to appoint a 
special master with any powers beyond the simply 
observational, as doing so would raise grave constitutional 
concerns, see e.g. Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128, 1141–42 
(D.C. Cir. 2003), and we do not doubt the Commission’s good 
faith in its efforts to comply with our requests. 
Because yet further litigation is, at this point, sadly 
foreseeable, this panel again retains jurisdiction over the 
remanded issues. 
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Prometheus Radio Project et al. v. Federal Communications 
Commission, Nos. 17-1107, 17-1109, 17-1110, 17-1111, 18-
1092, 18-1669, 18-1670, 18-1671, 18-2943 & 18-3335,   
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part 
 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 mandates that the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regularly review 
its broadcast media ownership rules to ensure they remain in 
step with the demands of a rapidly evolving marketplace. Yet 
some of these rules date back to the 1990s and early 2000s, and 
one all the way to 1975, before the Internet revolutionized 
American media consumption. Americans today increasingly 
rely on online sources for local news and information. Studies 
in the record reinforce what most people old enough to recall 
the days before WiFi and iPads understand instinctively: the 
explosion of Internet sources has accompanied the decline of 
reliance on traditional media. The realities of operating a viable 
broadcasting enterprise today look little like they did when the 
FCC enacted the current ownership rules. Despite all of this, 
the FCC’s broadcast ownership rules remained largely static 
for fifteen years. 
 
The FCC’s most recent review of its ownership rules 
culminated in an order that accounted for these changes. The 
FCC evaluated the current market dynamics, concluded the 
existing rules built for a pre-Internet marketplace no longer 
serve the public interest, and repealed or modified the rules 
accordingly. The FCC weighed the rules’ effects on 
competition, localism, and diversity to determine what changes 
would advance the public interest.  
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I join several parts of my colleagues’ decision, 
including their rejection of the challenges to the incubator 
program’s “comparable markets” definition and the 
Reconsideration Order’s retention of a modified “top-four” 
restriction in the Local TV Rule. But I do not share their 
conclusion that the Reconsideration Order and Incubator 
Order are arbitrary and capricious. In my view, the FCC 
balanced competing policy goals and reasonably predicted the 
regulatory changes dictated by the broadcast markets’ 
competitive dynamics will be unlikely to harm ownership 
diversity. I would not delay the FCC’s actions. I would allow 
the rules to take effect and direct the FCC to evaluate their 
effects on women- and minority-broadcast ownership in its 
2018 quadrennial review.  
 
I. 
 The parties are intimately familiar with the FCC’s 
quadrennial review of the broadcast ownership rules. See 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 824 F.3d 33 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(Prometheus III); Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 
431 (3d Cir. 2011) (Prometheus II); Prometheus Radio Project 
v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004) (Prometheus I). I 
summarize the relevant history and principles that guide this 
process before briefly reviewing the FCC’s most recent action. 
 
A. 
 The orders at issue stem from the FCC’s review of its 
broadcast ownership rules. Through these rules the FCC 
advances its statutory mandate to regulate broadcast media as 
“public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 303; see Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214 
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(1943). Early versions of the ownership rules cabined common 
ownership within and across broadcast media to promote the 
public interest. See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 
436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978) (NCCB). The FCC adopted broadcast 
ownership rules with the objective to “promot[e] competition 
among the mass media” and to “maximiz[e] diversification of 
services sources and viewpoints.” Id. at 784 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). These in turn would benefit the 
public through higher quality programming and broader 
options. The FCC determines the appropriate amount of 
common ownership by weighing the harms of excessive 
concentration—diminished programming diversity, stifled 
competition, and the like—against the competitive realities of 
running viable broadcast enterprises.  
 
A need for regulatory reform became palpable as the 
Internet emerged, transforming how Americans receive news 
and entertainment. Rapid technological change had left the 
framework regulating media ownership ill-suited to the 
marketplace’s needs. The public interest analysis at the heart 
of the FCC’s ownership rules is as dynamic as the media 
landscape. A static set of ownership regulations could not serve 
the public interest for all time. See Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 
437 (Scirica, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 
 With continued change all but certain, Congress 
retooled the approach to regulating affected markets. It enacted 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 
110 Stat. 56, which directs the FCC to review the broadcast 
ownership rules periodically. The relevant provision, Section 
202(h), instructs:  
 
The Commission shall review . . . all of its 
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ownership rules [quadrennially] as part of its 
regulatory reform review . . . and shall determine 
whether any of [its] rules are necessary in the 
public interest as the result of competition. The 
Commission shall repeal or modify any 
regulation it determines to be no longer in the 
public interest.  
 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 202(h), as amended by 
Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99–100 (2004). 
“[C]ompetition, localism, and diversity” are the values that 
guide the FCC’s “public interest” analysis under Section 
202(h). Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 400; see also id. at 446 
(Scirica, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). The 
FCC considers five types of diversity: viewpoint, outlet, 
program, source, and minority and women ownership. See id. 
at 446 (Scirica, C.J. dissenting in part and concurring in part) 
(summarizing the FCC’s analysis in its 2002 biennial review 
order). 
 
Embodied in Section 202(h) is the imperative that the 
broadcast ownership rules stay in sync with the media 
marketplace. See id. at 391. What is in the “public interest” 
changes over time as the marketplace evolves, so the FCC must 
reassess competitive conditions to set appropriate regulations. 
The provision’s language and the accompanying legislative 
history reveal a belief that “opening all telecommunications 
markets to competition” will best suit a marketplace comprised 
of diverse media platforms and shaped by technological 
advancement. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996) (Conf. 
Rep.). Section 202(h) directs the FCC to assess the harms of 
consolidation and abandon restrictions that deprive the public 
of competitive benefits associated with some levels of common 
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ownership. 0 F1  
 
B. 
 The FCC concluded its 2010/14 quadrennial review by 
largely retaining the rules restricting common ownership. See 
Second Report & Order, 2014 Quadrennial Regulatory 
Review, 31 FCC Rcd. 9864 (2016) (2016 Report & Order). The 
rules, according to the FCC, “promote[d] competition and a 
diversity of viewpoints in local markets, thereby enriching 
local communities through the promotion of distinct and 
antagonistic voices.” Id. ¶ 3. 
 
 On petitions for reconsideration, the FCC repealed or 
loosened most of these ownership rules. See Order on 
Reconsideration and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 32 FCC 
Rcd. 9802 (2017) (Reconsideration Order). The thrust of the 
FCC’s analysis is that technological innovation and 
fundamental changes to the media marketplace have eroded 
many of the assumptions underlying the ownership rules. See, 
e.g., id. ¶¶ 1, 19, 22, 43, 60, 71–73. The rules have thus ceased 
serving the public interest. The Internet boom has ushered in 
rivals that enjoy competitive advantages vis-à-vis broadcasters. 
The ownership rules impede broadcasters’ ability to engage in 
procompetitive transactions without offering compensating 
benefits to the public. 
The FCC’s repeal of the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-
Ownership (NBCO) Rule illustrates the Reconsideration 
Order’s public interest balancing. The NBCO Rule barred 
                                              
1  Although framed in deregulatory terms, we have 
understood the provision to allow modifications making the 
rules “more or less stringent.” Prometheus I, 372 F.3d at 395. 
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combinations between broadcast stations and local newspapers 
to preserve “strong local voices.” Id. ¶ 9. When the rule was 
adopted in 1975, daily print newspapers constituted a 
predominant voice in local news. The rule thus promoted 
viewpoint diversity and localism by ensuring independent 
sources of local content. But the FCC’s careful study and 
informed judgment show this reasoning no longer holds. 
Traditional media compete with “digital-only news outlets 
with no print or broadcast affiliation.” Id. ¶ 19. The FCC 
determined that the burst of Internet sources means local 
newspapers’ independence from broadcast is no longer 
essential to promote viewpoint diversity. See id. ¶¶ 18–22. The 
flipside of this growth is the dwindling significance of print 
newspapers. Repealing the NBCO Rule, the FCC determined, 
lifts a barrier to combinations that may enhance localism. See 
id. ¶ 26. Transactions between broadcasters and local 
newspapers could enable “collaboration and cost-sharing” that 
improve program quality. Id. ¶ 27. These efficiencies could 
“attract new investment in order to preserve and expand” local 
programming. Id. ¶ 42. The FCC predicted repeal of the NBCO 
Rule “is unlikely to have a significant effect on minority and 
female ownership in” broadcast markets in part because 
broadcasters would be better positioned to acquire newspapers 
than the reverse. Id. ¶ 46. So ownership diversity, like 
competition and localism, did not justify keeping the rule. See 
id. ¶ 48. 
 
While the FCC’s public interest analysis balances 
competition, localism, and diversity, the last consideration has 
attracted most of the attention in this litigation. Neither the 
2016 Report & Order nor Reconsideration Order found 
evidence that showed keeping or changing the rules would 
affect ownership diversity. “[E]mpirical study of the 
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relationship between cross-ownership restrictions” and 
ownership diversity is complicated by “obstacles that make 
such study impractical and unreliable,” the FCC observed, yet 
it invited comment on both study design and the likely 
connection. Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of The 
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules 
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, et al., Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and 
Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd. 4371 ¶ 198 n.595 (2014) 
(2014 FNPRM). The 2016 Report & Order rejected arguments 
that making the rules more restrictive “will promote increased 
opportunities for minority and female ownership” because the 
record lacked evidence supporting such a causal connection. ¶ 
77 (Local TV Rule); see id. ¶ 127 (Local Radio Rule). The 
Reconsideration Order considered the consequences of 
relaxing the rules on ownership diversity and determined the 
record did not support arguments that minority and women 
broadcasters would be harmed by the changes. See, e.g., ¶ 15 
(NBCO Rule) (“[W]e find that eliminating the rule will have 
no material effect on minority and female broadcast 
ownership.”). No commenter introduced evidence that 
contradicted the FCC’s prediction that changing the rules 
would unlikely affect ownership diversity. The 
Reconsideration Order announced the FCC’s intention to 
pursue an incubator program, to facilitate entry and bolster 
ownership diversity. See ¶¶ 121–25.  
 
II. 
Citizen Petitioners contend the FCC’s orders are 
arbitrary and capricious because they do not adequately 
analyze the new rules’ likely effects on minority and women 
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broadcast ownership. The APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard together with Section 202(h) guide our review. 
 
We must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions” that are “arbitrary [or] capricious.” 
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Under this deferential review, we uphold 
the FCC’s decision provided it “examine[d] the relevant data 
and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action 
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and 
the choice made.’” Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting 
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 
(1962)). Where, as here, the FCC makes predictions about the 
likely consequences of its decisions, “complete factual support 
in the record for [its] judgment or prediction is not possible or 
required.” NCCB, 436 U.S. at 814; Rural Cellular Ass’n v. 
FCC, 588 F.3d 1095, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Where . . . the 
FCC must make predictive judgments about the effects of [its 
regulations], certainty is impossible.”). These predictions are 
“less amenable to rigid proof”; they “are more in the nature of 
policy decisions entitled to substantial deference.” NAACP v. 
FCC, 682 F.2d 993, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d on other 
grounds, FCC v. Fox Telev. Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 
(2009).  
 
As this Court has emphasized and notes again here, 
Section 202(h) “also affects our standard of review.” 
Prometheus III, 824 F.3d at 40; see Maj. Op. 18. To the extent 
the meaning of Section 202(h) is disputed, the question would 
ordinarily “implicat[e] an agency’s construction of the statute 
which it administers,” thus triggering “the principles of 
deference described in” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
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INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999); see also 
Sinclair Broad. Grp. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 165 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (deferring to FCC’s reasonable interpretation of another 
provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 under 
Chevron).  
 
III. 
 My colleagues find, “based on the evidence and 
reasoning the Commission has given us,” it has not satisfied its 
obligation to show changes in the ownership rules “will not 
harm ownership diversity.” Maj. Op. 39. But the FCC enjoys a 
measure of deference when it balances policy objectives based 
on predictions of the consequences of its rules. This key 
disagreement leads me to depart from my colleagues in three 
respects. First, because the FCC’s consideration of the 
interplay between its ownership rules and ownership diversity 
satisfies the APA and Section 202(h), I would deny the 
challenges to the Reconsideration Order and allow the new 
rules to take effect. Second, I believe the substance of the 
FCC’s eligible entity definition and the process by which it was 
adopted accords with the APA. Third, I do not believe the FCC 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously when it adopted the Incubator 
Order. Accordingly, I would deny the petitions and allow the 
FCC’s orders to take effect. 
 
A. 
 Citizen Petitioners leave untouched the FCC’s core 
determination that the ownership rules have ceased to serve the 
“public interest.” The Reconsideration Order chronicles 
significant changes throughout media markets and explains 
why maintaining the rules no longer serves that public interest 
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goal. No party identifies any reason to question the FCC’s key 
competitive findings and judgments. Citizen Petitioners argue 
instead that all the rule changes that make up the 
Reconsideration Order should be vacated because the FCC did 
not adequately consider the new rules’ likely effects on 
women- and minority-broadcast ownership. But neither 
Section 202(h) nor the APA requires the FCC to quantify the 
future effects of its new rules as a prerequisite to regulatory 
action. Congress prescribed an iterative process; the FCC must 
take a fresh look at its rules every four years. This process 
assumes the FCC can gain experience with its policies so it 
may assess how its rules function in the marketplace. The FCC 
has sufficiently explained its decision and deserves an 
opportunity to implement its policies. 
 
Citizen Petitioners overlook “that the Commission’s 
judgment regarding how the public interest is best served is 
entitled to substantial judicial deference.” FCC v. WNCN 
Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981). The FCC’s Section 
202(h) review typifies agency policymaking entitled to 
deference, subject to the APA. Section 202(h) directs the FCC 
to balance competing goals—competition, localism, and 
diversity—to guarantee that its “regulatory framework [keeps] 
pace with the competitive changes in the marketplace.” 
Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 391. The FCC enjoys a 
“considerable amount of discretion” when it weighs objectives 
to reach policy decisions. Rural Cellular, 588 F.3d 1095, 1103 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). The record confirms the FCC analyzed the relevant 
considerations and properly exercised its discretion. See, e.g., 
Reconsideration Order ¶ 63 (Radio/TV Cross-Ownership 
Rule) (concluding the rule “no longer strikes an appropriate 
balance between the protection of viewpoint diversity and the 
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potential public interest benefits that could result from the 
efficiencies gained by common ownership of radio and 
television stations in a local market”); see also id. ¶¶ 55–58 
(rule no longer contributes substantially to viewpoint 
diversity); id. ¶ 59 (rule is out of step with “realities of the 
digital media marketplace”); id. ¶ 62 (“rule already permits 
significant cross-ownership in local markets”); id. ¶ 64 (“no 
evidence that any additional common ownership” resulting 
from repeal “would disproportionately or negatively impact 
minority- and female-owned stations”). 
 
Traditional principles of deference are particularly apt 
here. Not every decision the FCC makes is susceptible to 
precise analysis; some “rest on judgment and prediction rather 
than pure factual determinations.” WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 
U.S. at 594. Predictions about the future effects of rules not yet 
in being are “inherently speculative.” Council Tree Inv’rs, Inc. 
v. FCC, 863 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2017) (Council Tree IV) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
The FCC reasonably predicted on the record before it 
that the new rules would not diminish or harm minority and 
women ownership. The question whether the rules and 
ownership diversity are interconnected was aired over the 
course of the 2010/14 quadrennial review. The FCC invited 
comment and data that might shed light on this connection. 
See, e.g., 2014 FNPRM ¶ 222. It concluded—based on its 
understanding of the broadcast markets, the evidence in the 
record, and the only data submitted—that repeal of the rules 
was unlikely to harm ownership diversity. See, e.g., 
Reconsideration Order ¶ 83 (Local TV Rule) (“In this lengthy 
proceeding, no party has presented contrary evidence or a 
compelling argument demonstrating why relaxing this rule 
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will” harm ownership diversity.); id. ¶ 69 (adopting revised 
rule based on understanding of changed competitive 
dynamics); id. ¶ 71 (observing changes in marketplace but 
noting “broadcast television stations still play a unique and 
important role in their local communities”); see also 2014 
FNPRM ¶ 224 (Radio/TV Cross-Ownership Rule) (noting no 
commenter has shown “low levels of [women and minority] 
ownership are a result of existing radio/television cross-
ownership rule”).2F2 The effect the new rules will have on 
women- and minority-broadcast ownership may remain 
difficult to uncover until the FCC gains experience with the 
new rules. See NCCB, 436 U.S. at 796–97; Council Tree Inv’rs, 
Inc. v. FCC, 619 F.3d 235, 252–53 (3d Cir. 2010). Faced with 
such a question, “complete factual support in the record for the 
                                              
2  To the extent my colleagues require the FCC to conduct 
empirical analysis on remand, they risk impermissibly adding 
requirements beyond the APA. See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers 
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015). They quote Stilwell v. 
Office of Thrift Supervision’s instruction that the “APA 
imposes no general obligation on agencies to produce 
empirical evidence.” Maj. Op. 38 (quoting 569 F.3d 514, 519 
(D.C. Cir. 2009)). But they argue Stilwell is distinguishable 
because there the agency relied on its “long experience” 
supervising the industry and did not act on “faulty and 
insubstantial data” like the FCC did here. Id. Setting aside the 
FCC’s eight decades regulating broadcast media, the basic 
principle that the APA “imposes no general obligation on 
agencies to produce empirical evidence” applies regardless of 
the quality of the data in the record. Stilwell, 569 F.3d at 519; 
see Council Tree IV, 863 F.3d at 244 (“[W]e review only for 
the use of relevant, not perfect, data.”). Were it otherwise, the 
principle would be meaningless. 
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Commission’s judgment or prediction is not possible or 
required.” NCCB, 436 U.S. at 814. Under these circumstances 
settled principles of administrative law counsel deference to 
the FCC’s prediction.3  
 
Citizen Petitioners emphasize that the FCC acted on 
faulty minority-ownership data and no women-ownership data. 
See, e.g., Citizen Petitioners’ Br. 26–30. This data, which the 
FCC acknowledged as imperfect, measured minority 
ownership before and after two prior regulatory changes—in 
1996 and 1999. Such data weaknesses are not fatal to the 
FCC’s regulations—not only because, as noted, data gaps are 
inherent to predictive regulation, but also because it is not 
certain the data demanded would alter the FCC’s analysis. 
First, Citizen Petitioners assume that the experience of these 
earlier changes will speak directly to the effects of the 
Reconsideration Order. Even if the FCC could obtain 
improved data on these decades-old regulatory changes, that 
information offers only modest predictive value for the 
consequences of the FCC’s current rules regarding 
modernization. Second, as noted the FCC considers five types 
of diversity, not to mention competition and localism. The 
FCC’s lack of some data relevant to one of these considerations 
should not outweigh its reasonable predictive judgments, 
                                              
3 This is true despite Citizen Petitioners’ criticism of the 
FCC’s methodology and data. Not only does the FCC have 
policymaking discretion, subject to the APA it also has 
discretion “to proceed on the basis of imperfect scientific 
information, rather than to invest the resources to conduct the 
perfect study.” Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 649 F.3d 695, 
717 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 
658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).  
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particularly in the absence of any contrary information, such 
that its entire policy update is held up.  
 
The FCC must “repeal or modify” rules that cease to 
serve the public interest even when it lacks optimal data. 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 202(h). The FCC has 
revised its Form 323 and conducted outreach programs to ease 
compliance with its reporting requirements. 2016 Report & 
Order ¶ 265. These are encouraging measures that could make 
the FCC’s data more reliable, benefiting future quadrennial 
reviews. The FCC intends to take up a variety of diversity-
related proposals in its 2018 quadrennial review. See 2018 
Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s 
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted 
Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 33 FCC Rcd. 12111 ¶¶ 
93–121 (2018). I would direct it to follow through on its 
announcement as well as study the effects of the latest rules on 
ownership diversity. I would not, however, delay the 
Reconsideration Order based on the analytical shortcomings 
Citizen Petitioners emphasize.  
 
In short, I believe the FCC has explained its decision. I 
would deny the petitions and allow the Reconsideration 
Order’s rule changes to take effect.   
 
B.  
 My colleagues remand the 2016 Report & Order’s 
eligible entity definition for the FCC to ascertain what effect 
the revenue-based definition will have on women and minority 
ownership. But the FCC adopted the eligible entity definition 
to “serve the public interest by promoting small business 
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participation in the broadcast industry and potential entry by 
new entrepreneurs.” See 2016 Report & Order ¶ 279; see id. ¶¶ 
280–86. It thoroughly explained its policy choice. The record 
indicated that the revenue-based eligible entity definition will 
promote the FCC’s “traditional policy objectives . . . by 
enhancing opportunities for small business[es].” Id. ¶ 281. The 
FCC’s brief experience with this definition confirmed “a 
significant number of broadcast licensees and permittees 
availed themselves of policies based on the revenue-based 
eligible entity standard.” Id. ¶ 283 (observing widespread use 
of the policy allowing certain eligible entities generous 
construction permits). No commenters argued the revenue-
based eligible entity definition does not serve the public 
interest according to the FCC’s analysis. Id. ¶ 276.  
 
This stands in contrast to the last time the FCC 
employed this definition. During its 2006 quadrennial review 
the FCC adopted a revenue-based eligibility entity definition 
to promote ownership diversity. The approach failed because 
the FCC provided no support for why its definition would “be 
effective in creating new opportunities for broadcast ownership 
by . . . women and minorities.” Prometheus II, 652 F.3d at 470 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The key 
distinction, of course, is the FCC’s policy decision to reorient 
its eligible entity definition. As revised, it is intended to 
“encourage innovation and enhance viewpoint diversity” by 
“promoting small business participation in the broadcast 
industry.” 2016 Report & Order ¶ 235. Because the FCC 
pursued the revenue-based definition in past efforts to promote 
ownership diversity, it evidently believed the definition would 
not harm ownership diversity. Nothing in the present record 
suggests otherwise. In my view the FCC properly complied 
with its obligations under the APA.  
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C.  
 Under today’s outcome, I regret that the FCC’s 
incubator program will not have an opportunity to stand or fall 
on its own merit. See Rules and Policies to Promote New Entry 
and Ownership Diversity in the Broadcasting Services, 33 FCC 
Rcd. 7911 (2018) (Incubator Order). Citizen Petitioners take 
issue with the program’s criteria for who is eligible to realize 
its benefits. The FCC adopted a two-prong eligible entity 
definition: participants must be both “new entrants” based on 
the number of stations owned and “small businesses” based on 
revenue. See id. ¶ 16. The FCC designed these criteria “to 
encourage new entry into” an “extremely capital-intensive” 
industry. Id. ¶ 18. The program’s benefits will not exclusively 
accrue to minority and women broadcasters as the eligibility 
criteria sweep in all emerging radio broadcasters. This breadth 
is consistent with the incubator program’s stated goal. Yet 
based on its review of data from incentive auctions, the FCC 
predicts that the “new entrant” prong will likely benefit 
prospective women and minority applicants. Id. ¶¶ 21–24. 
 
 The incubator program is a reasonable policy designed 
to “support the entry of new and diverse voices into the 
broadcast industry.” Id. ¶ 1. The FCC “has long contemplated 
the potential for” a program that pairs emerging and 
experienced broadcasters to ease entry into radio broadcasting. 
Id. ¶ 2. The Incubator Order established the first program to 
convert these ideas into a concrete policy. See ¶ 3. Before 
adopting the program, the FCC considered alternative 
eligibility criteria and invited “comment on how to determine 
eligibility for participation in the incubator program.” Id ¶ 17; 
see id. ¶¶ 28–30 (declining to adopt competing proposals that 
might prove “administratively inefficient,” and committing to 
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“conduct outreach to help encourage participation in the 
incubator program by mission-based entities and Native 
American Nations” that are eligible). It then provided 
comprehensive reasoning to justify the path it chose. See id. ¶ 
20 (“The record reflects that individuals seeking to purchase 
their first or second broadcast station are the ones that often 
face the most challenging financial hurdles.”); id. ¶ 21 (citing 
incentive auction data showing definition could modestly 
benefit women and minorities); id. ¶ 22 (citing comments 
suggesting the same); id. ¶ 25 & n.53 (noting that revenue cap 
narrows band of eligible entities); id. ¶ 27 (“Use of an objective 
standard has the advantage of being straightforward and 
transparent for potential applicants, as well as administrable for 
the Commission without application of significant additional 
processing resources.”). The FCC complied with the APA in 
determining its “eligible entity” definition. Its choice, in my 
view, is an aspect of program design largely left to the agency’s 
policy discretion, subject to the APA, Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, and other relevant statutes. The FCC’s order draws a 
rational line between the record and decision made, and I 
would allow the incubator program to take effect. 
 
IV. 
 For the reasons provided, I would deny the petitions for 
review and allow the FCC’s orders to take effect. 
